More than Words: Communication in Intergroup Conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies the problem of collective action. We observe the effect of different communication structures on collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflicts.Communication, Conflict, Experiment, Rent-seeking

Cooperativeness and Impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons

This paper examines the role of other-regarding and time preferences for cooperation in the field. We study the preferences of fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from using a common pool resource (CPR). The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future yield for both others and themselves. Accordingly, economic theory predicts that more cooperative and more patient individuals should be less likely to exploit the CPR. Our data supports this prediction because fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, exploit the fishing grounds less in their daily lives. Moreover, because the laboratory public goods game exhibits no inter-temporal spillovers, measured time preferences should not predict cooperative behavior in the laboratory. This prediction is also borne out by our data. Thus, laboratory preference measures are useful to capture important dimensions of field behavior.cooperation, common pool resource, experiments, generalizability, methodology

An Experimental Study on the Relevance and Scope of Culture as a Focal Point

This paper uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a focal point. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play stag-hunt coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that subjects are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if the only piece of information they have about their partner is that they have the same nationality. However, if subjects receive additional information about their partner, subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. We also do not find that subjects are less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium when their partner has a different nationality as compared to when the partner’s nationality is unknown. In addition, we observe that giving subjects information about their partner in general increases the risk of miscoordination. Thus, our findings suggest that nationality can serve as a coordination device but also that the scope of this device is limited.Coordination, Focal points, Cultural economics, Inter-cultural lab experiments, In-group behavior.

Individual Heterogeneity in Punishment and Reward

We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. Our findings qualify existing evidence and suggest that the largest fraction of players is motivated by a mixture of both inequity-aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequity-aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to reconcile important phenomena reported in the experimental literature on punishment and reward.Heterogeneity; inequity aversion; monetary punishment/reward; reciprocity; social norms.

Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on the outcome reached by a different pair of subjects. Surprisingly, giving the first mover the last word benefits the second mover. Letting the committee decide increases the first mover’s trust. And first and second movers pass different types of judgments when they act as a committee. Au cours de trois jeux de confiance différents, nous alternons la personne qui aura le dernier mot sur le résultat : le premier joueur, le deuxième joueur, ou un comité (à qui revient la décision) composé du premier et du second joueur. Ce comité fonctionne de manière similaire à la révision conventionnelle par les pairs, où des joueurs expérimentés passent un jugement sur les résultats préalablement réalisés par deux joueurs différents. Étonnamment, donner le dernier mot au premier joueur donne l’avantage au deuxième joueur. D’autre part, laisser le comité prendre la décision augmente la confiance du premier joueur. Finalement, les premiers et seconds joueurs passent différents types de jugements lorsqu’ils font partie d’un comité.experimental economics, peer review, social norm, social preferences, third-party punishment, trust, confiance, économie expérimentale, normes sociales, préférences sociales, révision par les pairs, sanctions par une tierce personne

Individual heterogeneity in punishment and reward

We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. Our findings qualify existing evidence and suggest that the largest fraction of players is motivated by a mixture of both inequity-aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequity-aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to reconcile important phenomena reported in the experimental literature on punishment and reward

Different carrots and different sticks: Do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove?

This paper reports lab data from four games in order to analyze and compare the motivations behind monetary punishment and reward and their non-monetary counterparts, disapproval and approval, an important question given that both types of punishment/rewards affect cooperation and norm compliance. The results in our games support the hypothesis that a motivation akin to reciprocity plays the key role for approval and disapproval whereas payoff comparisons play the key role for monetary rewards and punishment

Do Competitive Work Places Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Gender Differences in Job-Entry Decisions

Recently an important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for why we observe gender imbalances in labor markets: men are more competitively inclined than women. Whether, and to what extent, such preferences yield differences in naturally-occurring labor market outcomes remains an open issue. We address this question by exploring job-entry decisions in a natural field experiment where we randomized nearly 7,000 interested job-seekers into different compensation regimes. By varying the role that individual competition plays in setting the wage, we are able to explore whether competition, by itself, can cause differential job entry. The data highlight the power of the compensation regime in that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings. Yet, there are important factors that attenuate the gender differences, including whether the job is performed in teams, whether the job task is female-oriented, and the local labor market.

Increasing Workplace Diversity: Evidence from a Recruiting Experiment at a Fortune 500 Company

While many firms have set ambitious goals to increase diversity in their ranks, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on effective ways to reach them. We use a natural field experiment to test several hypotheses on effective meansto attract minority candidates for top professional careers. By randomly varying the content in recruiting materials of a major financial services corporation with more than 10,000 employees, we find that signaling explicit interest in employee diversity more than doubles the interest in openings among racial minority candidates, as well as the likelihood that they apply and are selected. Impacts on gender diversity are less sharp and generally not significan

Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment